


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*Committee 12(2)*

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SECURITY COMMITTEE**

SECOM-M-173  
18 April 1975

Minutes  
One Hundred Seventy-Third Meeting  
Tuesday, 15 April 1975, 1000 to 1130 Hours  
Room 6F-25, CIA Headquarters



Chairman  
Presiding

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MEMBERS PRESENT




ALTERNATES PRESENT



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ALSO PRESENT



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Preliminary Remarks

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☐ The Chairman noted that the results of the classification review of the Study of Harassments and Provocations had been completed and distributed on 24 March to all members. While the overall study retains the SECRET classification, many of the examples were downgraded or declassified. This may permit a wider use of some portions. The Navy member who had requested the review said that lower classification or downgrading would reflect a more creditable level of classification as well as permitting an expanded use.

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☐ The Chairman mentioned that the guides for sanitization of certain documents to be provided to Select Committees had been forwarded to the Chairman, Ad Hoc Group. The Chairman expressed appreciation to the members for their assistance in preparing the guides. While there was nothing official known about the disposition or use of the guides, there was some indication that they had been brought to the attention of the DCI who, after suggesting a change in the title to replace the word "sanitization," thought the guides seemed appropriate.

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☐ A list was distributed of names, dates and places of birth and social security numbers of 34 members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and who are certified by the Chairman, Senate Select Committee, as meeting requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. The Chairman, Security Committee, said that this list had also been made available to representatives of the Ad Hoc Group. Additional names will be provided as they become available. In response to a question by the Navy member, the Chairman mentioned that nothing new had been learned on the status of discussions about compartmented secrecy oaths with the Senate Select Committee. The basic issues revolves around jurisdictional and protocol matters. A resolution is anticipated some

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time this week. The NSA noted that some staff personnel were born outside of the United States and asked if all were American citizens. While no member was able to respond conclusively, there was a generally affirmative presumption.

25X1 [ ] The Chairman mentioned that [ ] Ad Hoc Group 25X1  
continues to address matters of community interest related to the  
Freedom of Information Act. No additional task related to the FOIA  
had been charged to the Security Committee. The Chairman said that  
numbers of requests for information under the FOIA continue to increase  
with the FBI and the CIA receiving a large number.

25X1 1. [ ] Approval of Minutes

There being no request for change, the minutes of the 18 March,  
25 March and 8 April meetings of the Security Committee were approved  
as published.

2. Report of Chairmen of Subcommittees

25X1 [ ] (a) Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee.

25X1 The Chairman of the Security Committee noted and commended [ ] 25X1  
Chairman, TSCS, and [ ] Executive Secretary, TSCS, for  
resumption of certain publications of community interest related to  
TSCS business. Two publications were issued in March:

(U) Technical Application Notes 011 [ ] 25X1

(C) Information Notice 75-1, Discovery of Radio Microphone

25X1  
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25X1 [ ] [ ] mentioned that the TSCS would meet next week  
at which time the Threat Assessment Study would be addressed.

25X1 [ ] (b) Computer Security Subcommittee. In the absence of the  
25X1 Chairman of this Subcommittee, [ ] mentioned that the Security  
Committee had agreed to conduct necessary coordination on the draft  
computer security policy paper which revised and updated DCID 1/16.  
Some comments had been received but concurrences or other comments

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were desired from ERDA, Air Force, CIA, FBI and NSA. (The Chairman mentioned that NSA was holding an internal meeting this date on this paper.) The Chairman encouraged each member to submit positions on this paper as soon as possible in the interest of moving ahead. The NSA member mentioned that there was some problem at NSA with the paper and he anticipated a non-concurrence. The Chairman said that while there may be additional need to work on the draft policy, he hoped that problems could be resolved either at the Subcommittee or Committee level. He did not want to forward problems to the USIB.

25X1 [ ] (c) Compartmentation Subcommittee. The Chairman, Security  
25X1 Committee, mentioned that [ ] Chairman, Compartmentation  
25X1 Subcommittee, and [ ] Chairman of the DCID 1/14 and DCID  
1/7 Working Groups, were present to report to the members.

[ ] said that he had attended some of the Working Group meetings and some of the Subcommittee meetings. He was impressed with the high interest and sustained level of effort that has gone into the work on these papers. He commended the representatives of each participating department and agency and addressed expression of special commendation to [ ]

In his report on DCID 1/7, [ ] noted that some progress was being made. A dialogue had been reiterated on those points which previously polarized the Working Group. There continued to be serious problems but a potential for resolution was surfacing.

Addressing DCID 1/14, Mr. Davis said that his Subcommittee had concluded hearings, prepared and submitted a draft report to the Security Committee (distributed to members on 11 April 1975, under cover of memorandum SECOM/CS-D2-75, for Chairman, Security Committee, from Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee, dated 10 April 1975).

Secretary's Note: Members are requested to change "paragraph 12" to paragraph 11 in first line of subparagraph 1 of that memorandum.

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25X1 [ ] mentioned that representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Defense Investigative Program office and OSD/Security Policy) participated in the preparation of the draft of DCID 1/14. Because of recent studies related to the personnel security investigative and adjudicative processes, these officers had suggested that a revised DCID 1/14 not be promulgated as of this time. After careful consideration of this proposal the Compartmentation Subcommittee elected to go ahead with the revision and submitted it to the Security Committee, noting the OSD proposal in a covering transmittal letter.

25X1 In response to [ ] offer to answer questions, the Navy member took the opportunity to express a proposal for a "letter of credit" for [ ] for his quiet, good-humored diligence in presiding over seemingly interminable meetings in the drafting of the proposed revision of DCID 1/14.

~~25X1~~ [ ] (d) Community Computer-Assisted Compartmentation Control Working Group. [ ] reported that he had received from [ ] copies of the CIA and DIA independent study on cost analysis of this proposal. [ ] informed that [ ] would meet with his working group members on 17 April to discuss the cost analysis studies. Following that meeting [ ] will be called upon for a status report to the Security Committee. [ ] mentioned that the results of the proposal may be of interest to other groups studying possible changes in compartmentation procedures.

25X1 [ ] (e) USIB Declassification Guidelines Working Group. The Chairman, Security Committee, said that he had been informed by Mr. Gambino's office that the ICRC has expressed the opinion that the draft guidelines are not in accord with the requirements of Executive Order 11652 and that Mr. Arthur Van Cook, Information Security Director in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy), has transmitted proposed revisions to [ ] who has in turn made them available to Mr. Gambino. While proposed revisions are not great, they represent another example of the long series of difficulties with this guidelines paper. [ ] expressed concern that the time and events may have overtaken the original purpose for which the guides were drafted. The Chairman mentioned

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to members that he intended to call a small meeting of interested parties to examine current difficulties, see if time has passed us by and try to get the paper moving to the Board.

The Navy member commented that while the Chairman should proceed toward suitable accommodations the members should keep in mind the necessity to revise Executive Order 11652. The Chairman informed of his awareness of current efforts to revise E.O. 11652 but did not think they related to or would affect the guidelines. Accordingly, he would go ahead and try to get the guidelines to the Board to approve or disapprove.

3. ☐ Discussion of Proposed Tasking of R&D Working Group

☐ Chairman, R&D Working Group, to discuss the status of current tasking proposals assigned the R&D Group. ☐ reported that the R&D Group had four tasks referred to it, one on Alarms by DIA and three by the Naval Investigative Service on document destruction, access control and security hazards of emanations of office equipment.

The R&D Group defined the scope of these tasks and drafted terms of reference at their March meeting. At the April meeting, the terms of reference were further discussed and working panels were established to address the problems.

The issue of the Alarm specifications will be addressed in two parts. First, a review of current state-of-the-art and present technology and secondly, action to consider formulation of alarm standards as a blend of three factors, development of specifications, testing and installation. This should permit consideration of the use of alarms as part of a complete security system. Depending upon application requirements, the system could be manipulated to satisfy unique problems.

R&D attention to the task on document destruction will be a two-part action. First, current community efforts will be reviewed. There are indications that today the community has sought a criterion

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for secure dry destruction based upon size of residual material. Such a criteria poses problems, for example, a residual chip 1/4 the size of a typewriter character might be an acceptable security criterion but the hardware necessary to produce such residue is expensive, bulky, dirty and noisy to operate. Further, problems arise in consideration of size reduction devices such as microfiche or other files where the criterion of 1/4 letter size might not provide sufficient protection. The R&D panel seems to be leaning away from a security criteria based on residual size and looking into a definition based on the "work factor" involved. How much work would be required to reconstitute residual chips to produce intelligence. If a criteria could be developed from this viewpoint, the R&D Group might be able to suggest a wide spectrum of acceptable hardware for document destruction.

In the field of access control, the R&D Group is operating on the assumption that the main thrust is to reduce the commitment of personnel to the control of access. Preliminary survey of current technology has surfaced that a significant amount of work has already been done on this problem by departments and agencies. Some hardware has been developed and is in the final testing stage before implementation. There are also indications that significant consideration and trade-offs may be required before any solid recommendations can be made for any given application.

With relation to a study of the hazards of emanations, a question has arisen as to purview of authority of the USIB. The United States Communications Security Board, a group co-equal in authority with USIB, has addressed the problem of emanations and has set forth standards, criteria and procedures for corrective actions to overcome these hazards. The R&D Group is of the opinion that careful consideration should be given to entering this field lest an unnecessary, expensive and duplicative effort results. The R&D Group will provide recommendations along this line to the Security Committee.

The Navy member asked if thought had been given to having the R&D Group serve in a clearinghouse capacity to match requirements and R&D efforts for the community's security needs.

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25X1 responded that such a role was implicit in the R&D Group's adjusted charter now before the TSCS. From attendance at many meetings, [ ] was able to report that there was an active sharing of information, experiences and details of systems among the working levels of the community. There was not any formalized organization for such activities as related to security.

The Chairman of the Security Committee expressed the view that the R&D Group should be encouraged, if feasible and proper, to concentrate R&D efforts, not only for the Security Committee, so as to realize the greatest benefits for the least expenditure. In a general discussion on this topic which followed it was acknowledged that coordinated efforts on R&D was desirable, that there was an ongoing degree of exchanges at the working level on security problems, that concerned officers were well motivated and knowledgeable, that there was no problem staffing working groups from departments and agencies of the USIB. There was concern expressed that technology is expanding at such a rapid rate that specialists in security are hard pressed to keep up and recognition that coverage of the technology with current limited assets would require selective consideration of what should receive attention.

The Chairman thanked [ ] for his report and expressed appreciation for his efforts. The Chairman reaffirmed his interest in the work in the R&D field and suggested members might wish to consider and discuss in the near future a previous proposal that the R&D Group be considered as a subcommittee. 25X1

25X1 4. [ ] New Business 25X1

The Chairman called on the CIA member for comments related to the security posture of the Senate Select Committee. [ ] mentioned that a recently conducted security survey of the Senate Committee's area had been discussed at the Ad Hoc Group meeting. While there were no problems observed with the physical security, there were questions about the procedures to be followed during sensitive testimony. [ ] had subsequently discussed these with [ ] and obtained satisfactory answers. Uncleared personnel will be cleared from the area during sensitive discussions. Telephones, with the 25X1

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exception of one line will be cut off. In addition [redacted] mentioned that his plan to alarm safes will be modified. A 24-hour guard will be used in the storage area.

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[redacted] referred to the report of the security survey and said that he would make a copy available to the Chairman but wished to respect [redacted] request that the report not be widely circulated.

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5. [redacted] Next Meeting

The Chairman acknowledged that there had been frequent meetings of the Committee and expressed the opinion that the pressures of the times and nature of the actions justified such a schedule. In keeping with this concept the Chairman sought and obtained agreement for an early meeting for the primary purpose of discussing the draft revision of DCID 1/14. The meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, 29 April 1975. Room to be announced.

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[redacted]  
Executive Secretary

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